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Policy Comment

Solving the Due Process Problem with
Military Commissions
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 prompted the creation of
two new adjudicatory bodies within the Department of Defense. First,
military commissions were established by presidential order just two
months after the attacks in order to prosecute members of al Qaeda for war
crimes.' The commissions are non-Article III courts (although they adhere
to many aspects of conventional criminal procedure) and are empowered to
try persons designated by the President as eligible for trial by commission
for offenses against the laws of war. No trials have yet taken place,
although commissions for four detainees have been convened, and fifteen
detainees have been designated for trial.2 Second, combatant status review
tribunals (CSRTs) were created in the wake of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld3 to
determine if detainees at Guantdnamo Bay are being properly held as
enemy combatants.4 A plurality of the Supreme Court held in Hamdi that "a
citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and
a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a
neutral decisionmaker., 5 The CSRTs aim to provide that "fair opportunity"

1. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Military
Order].
2. See News Transcript, Department of Defense, Defense Department Briefing on Military
Commission Hearings (Aug. 17, 2004), availableat http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/
tr20040817-1164.html.
3. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
4. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to Secretary of the
Navy (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mi/news/Jul2OO4/d2OO4O707review.pdf
(describing CSRTs).
5. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648 (plurality opinion).
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to individuals who the government alleges are enemy combatants and hence
subject to detention until the end of hostilities.
This Comment's principal goal is to explore the interplay between the
military commissions and the CSRTs. A plethora of law review articles
have dealt with military commissions, 6 and the CSRTs have been covered
at length in the press. 7 There has been almost no effort, however, to analyze
how the two institutions fit together or how the lessons of one could be used
to solve the potential constitutional problems of the other. This Comment
seeks to fill that gap. In particular, it argues that there is a serious
constitutional flaw in the military commissions' procedure for establishing
personal jurisdiction and that, in an ironic twist, this flaw can be mended
through a modest broadening of the scope of the CSRTs' fact-finding
powers.
Part I describes the looming due process problem with the military
commissions: that there is currently no mechanism by which individuals
who dispute their eligibility to be tried by commission can resolve this
jurisdictional issue. This Part argues that this aspect of the commissions'
procedure is unconstitutional under case law on both Article III personal
jurisdiction and unilateral executive designations. Part II contends that this
due process problem can best be solved by expanding the decisionmaking
range of the CSRTs. Rather than merely determining whether a detainee is
an enemy combatant, the CSRTs should also decide whether a detainee
found to be an enemy combatant is a lawful combatant, immune from trial
by military commission, or an unlawful combatant, subject to such trial.
Part II also argues that the CSRTs are better positioned to make this
determination than either conventional courts or the military commissions
themselves. Part III concludes.
I
Critics have identified a host of potential legal problems with military
commissions. Commissions may offend the principle of separation of
powers because they were not explicitly authorized by Congress, they may
violate the Equal Protection Clause because they are applicable only to
6. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What
a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261 (2002); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence
H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, III YALE L.J. 1259 (2002);
David Glazier, Note, Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal?:Judging the 21st Century Military
Commission, 89 VA. L. REV. 2005 (2003).
7. See, e.g., Zachary R. Dowdy, Debate Drags on over U.S. Detainees, NEWSDAY (N.Y.),
Oct. 25, 2004, at A4; Neil A. Lewis, Scrutiny of Review Tribunals as War Crimes Trials Open,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2004, at A12; Charlie Savage, Freed Detainee Said To Train at Militant
Camps, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 2, 2004, at A7.
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noncitizens, they may contravene provisions of the Uniform Code of8
Military Justice, and they may be illegal under the Geneva Conventions.
One problem with military commissions that has not been extensively
analyzed, however, is the jurisdictional one: At present, a detainee has no
opportunity to challenge the President's determination that he may be tried
by commission. 9
Under the Military Order that created the military commissions, not
everyone is subject to trial by commission for offenses against the laws of
war. Rather, the Order applies only to noncitizens who the President
determines (1) are current or past members of al Qaeda, (2) have been
involved in acts of international terrorism directed at the United States, or
(3) have knowingly harbored such persons.10 The personal jurisdiction of
military commissions is further limited by Ex parte Quirin,which held that
only unlawful combatants "are subject to trial and punishment by military
tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful."'" Under Quirin
8. For a comprehensive discussion of the potential problems with military commissions, see
Katyal & Tribe, supra note 6. See also Petition for Writ of Mandamus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361 or, in the Alternative, Writ of Habeas Corpus, Swift ex rel. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No.
CV04-0777L (W.D. Wash. filed Aug. 9, 2004), transferredsub nom. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No.
04-1519 (JR), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22724 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 2004) (No. CV04-0777L)
[hereinafter Swift Petition], available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/nkk/documents/
Swift_000.pdf (making eight separate claims against the validity of military commissions).
9. I have not found any mention of this constitutional difficulty in the literature on military
commissions. The petition in Swift (filed on behalf of Salim Hamdan, one of the four detainees for
whom military commissions have been convened) argues that no commission has personal
jurisdiction over Hamdan but does not contend that Hamdan's trial would violate the Due Process
Clause if he did not have the ability to challenge the commission's personal jurisdiction. Swift
Petition, supra note 8, at 22-23. The recent district court opinion halting Hamdan's trial also does
not mention due process. It does, however, make the related argument that, under the Third
Geneva Convention, Hamdan is entitled to POW protections (which include not being tried by a
military commission for war crimes) until his combatant status "'has been determined by a
competent tribunal."' Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 04-1519 (JR), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22724, at
*23-25 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 2004) (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3324, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 142 [hereinafter Third
Geneva Convention]). Because the Due Process Clause provides more robust procedural
protections than the Third Geneva Convention's modest guarantee of a "competent tribunal," this
Comment focuses on the constitutional difficulties with military commissions and how to resolve
them. If the commissions' due process problem is solved, their Geneva Convention flaw will ipso
facto be repaired as well.
10. Military Order, supra note 1, at 57,834.
11. 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942). For other cases limiting the personal jurisdiction of military
commissions, see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 22 (1957) (plurality opinion) ("[M]ilitary trial of
civilians is inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of the constitution." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); and Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866) ("[The President's war
").
power cannot] sanction a military trial ...for any offence whatever of a citizen in civil life ....
The reason for these limitations is that broader jurisdiction for military commissions raises serious
executive/judicial separation-of-powers issues.
Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention codifies the definitions of lawful and unlawful
combatants. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 9, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138. Article
4 provides that members of organized resistance movements are lawful combatants entitled to
POW status only if they have a commander, carry a "fixed distinctive sign," carry arms openly,
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and the Military Order, therefore, military commissions, unlike
conventional criminal courts, do not have personal jurisdiction over all
alleged criminals in the territory they cover. Rather, to be subject to trial by
military commission, an individual must both fit within one of the
categories of persons identified in the Military Order and, as required by
Quirin, be an unlawful combatant.
The due process problem with the post-September 11 military
commissions, then, is that they provide no mechanism for a defendant who
contests his commission's personal jurisdiction over him to effectuate that
protest.12 The President alone determines that an individual is subject to the
Military Order, and upon that determination the individual may be tried for
war crimes even though he denies that he is an unlawful combatant or that
he meets the Order's three criteria for eligibility.' 3
Two distinct lines of doctrine indicate that this aspect of the military
commissions' procedure is unconstitutional. First, cases in the Article III
setting have long held that a defendant is always entitled to challenge a
court's personal jurisdiction over him. Because the "requirement that a
court have personal jurisdiction flows.., from the Due Process Clause"
and "recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest,"1 4 it would
subvert the defendant's constitutional rights to try him without first
affording him an opportunity to contest the court's personal jurisdiction. So
important is the individual's interest in being certain of the court's personal
jurisdiction over him that the alleged "deprivation of a right not to be tried
is... immediately appealable."' 5 Analogizing to the military commission
context, it is a violation of due process for a detainee to face trial by

and act "in accordance with the laws and customs of war." Id. It is likely that an individual who
meets the Military Order's criteria for trial by commission would also be an unlawful combatant
under Article 4. To the extent that the Military Order and Article 4 produce divergent outcomes,
however, the requirement of unlawful combatant status must be met before trial by commission
becomes lawful. As Quiin held, unlawful combatant status, not the Military Order's criteria, is

the sine qua non of eligibility for trial by commission.
12. I am assuming here that defendants before military commissions are entitled to invoke
due process rights. This is a debatable assumption, cf Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 78384 (1950), but recent cases suggest that it is a correct one, cf Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698
n. 15 (2004).
13. Military Order, supra note 1, at 57,834.
14. Ins. Corp. ofIr. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
15. Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 499 (1989) (emphasis omitted). A court's
ruling on personal jurisdiction is usually not subject to interlocutory appeal, but that is because
another court that would have personal jurisdiction typically exists. In the case of military
commissions, however, personal jurisdiction is based on status rather than geographic ties, so
there is no other commission that can try a person over whom the original commission lacks
personal jurisdiction. At present, an Article III court's ruling on personal jurisdiction cannot
deprive an individual of a "right not to be tried," while the President's designation of eligibility
for trial by military commission can.
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commission without first having had the chance to argue that he is
ineligible for such a trial.
Second, case law outside the Article III setting has established that
designations by the Executive almost never suffice to justify government
actions that severely harm an individual. Such designations carry a great
risk of error because the person affected is unable to present her side of the
story. They also undermine the individual's dignity interest by preventing
her from having her voice heard.' 6 As a result, the Executive may not17
unilaterally determine that an individual is ineligible for welfare benefits;
subject to confinement in a mental hospital;' 8 subject to internment or
deportation as an enemy alien; 19 or, as Hamdi recently established,
detainable until the end of hostilities as an enemy combatant. 20 The
situation of the military commission defendant is no different. Under the
Military Order, a unilateral presidential determination made with no input
from or consultation with the detainee allows him to be tried by military
commission, where he may be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.2 1
The detainee therefore risks being deprived by the Executive of a
significant liberty interest-the right not to stand trial-without ever having
had his objections heard. 2
II
There are several ways in which the due process problem with military
commissions could be solved. An Article III court could evaluate the
detainee's claim that he is ineligible for trial by military commission if he
files a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.23 Or the procedures of the
military commissions could be changed so that the President's
determination that an individual is subject to the Military Order is no longer

16. See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) ("The fundamental requisite of due
process of law is the opportunity to be heard.").
17. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970).
18. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980).
19. United States ex rel Schwarzkopfv. Uhl, 137 F.2d 898, 900 (2d Cir. 1943).
20. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004) (plurality opinion).
21. See 32 C.F.R. § 16.3(a) (2004) ("Any lawful punishment or condition of punishment is
authorized, including death.").
22. Despite being based on international law rather than due process, the district court's
analysis in Hamdan, see supra note 9, is similar. "The government must convene a competent
tribunal . . . and seek a specific determination as to Hamdan's status under the Geneva
Conventions. Until or unless such a tribunal decides otherwise, Hamdan has, and must be
accorded, the full protections of a prisoner-of-war." Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 04-1519 (JR), 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22724, at *25 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 2004).
23. See, e.g., Swift Petition, supra note 8, at 22-23 (seeking habeas and mandamus relief from
federal district court in part on the ground that Hamdan's military commission lacks personal

jurisdiction over him).
-- 114 Yale L.J.
2004-2005
ImagedHeinOnline
with the Permission
of925
Yale
Law Journal

926

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 114: 921

final and the individual can challenge that determination before the
commission. But the most practical and accurate way to ensure that an
individual is properly brought before a military commission is neither to
deposit the problem in the lap of an Article III court nor to fiddle with the
commissions' own procedures. Rather, the best way is to entrust the CSRTs
with determining not only whether a detainee is an enemy combatant but
also what kind of enemy combatant he is. In the language of the Military
Order and Quirin, the CSRTs should rule on (1) whether an enemy
combatant is a current or past member of al Qaeda, has been involved in
acts of international terrorism directed at the United States, or has
knowingly harbored such persons (thus fulfilling the three criteria listed in
the Military Order) and (2) whether an enemy combatant is lawful or
unlawful. Only if a detainee's CSRT finds that he both meets the Military
Order's criteria and is an unlawful combatant should he be subject to trial
by military commission.
A determination of this sort by the CSRTs would resolve in one blow
the due process problem with the commissions. The commissions' personal
jurisdiction would no longer simply be asserted by the Executive without
any opportunity for the detainee to object to the determination. Rather, the
detainee would be able to introduce evidence and present arguments about
why he is ineligible for trial by commission, and a quasi-judicial body, the
CSRT, would then adjudicate the challenge.
It is true that the CSRTs' procedural protections are less robust than
those of an Article III court, meaning that a CSRT's determination that a
detainee is eligible for trial by commission would not be quite as rigorous
as a court's finding that it has personal jurisdiction over a defendant. This
contrast between CSRTs and Article III courts is not especially worrisome,
though. The core of the due process right at stake is that the detainee have a
hearing before his eligibility for trial by commission is determined-not
that he have a full-blown Article III proceeding on that issue.24 In addition,
what the CSRTs lack in process they make up for in expertise; with three
military officers composing each tribunal, the CSRTs are more qualified
than civilian courts to answer questions about combatant status on the
battlefield. 25 Finally, the individual interest implicated in a determination of
eligibility for trial by military commission is of roughly the same weight as
24. See, e.g., Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648-50 (plurality opinion) (requiring hearing, but not
Article III proceeding, on enemy combatant status); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266-68 (same for

eligibility for welfare).
25. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 448 (1987) ("[C]ivil courts are ill equipped to

establish policies regarding matters of military concern." (internal quotation marks omitted)). If
Article Ill courts are ill equipped to try servicemembers for offenses against civilians-the issue
at stake in Solorio-they are far less capable of determining an enemy fighter's precise status on
the battlefield.
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the interest implicated in a finding of combatant status.26 If the CSRTs can
constitutionally adjudicate the latter, 27 they should also be able to
legitimately evaluate the former.
Assuming that broadening the scope of the CSRTs solves the due
process problem with the military commissions, the questions then become
whether the CSRTs are well positioned to assess what kind of enemy
combatant a detainee is, and whether they are better suited to this task than
Article III courts or military commissions themselves. The CSRTs are
ideally situated to determine whether an enemy combatant is lawful or
unlawful because the questions of whether a detainee is an enemy
combatant and what kind of enemy combatant he is are so tightly
intertwined. The same evidence that informs the CSRTs on the first
question would also enable them to answer the second. For example,
witnesses who observed the detainee fighting-thereby establishing that he
is a combatant-could also testify about whether he carried arms openly;
bore a fixed, distinctive sign; or otherwise qualified for POW protection as
a lawful combatant. Having found that a given detainee was an enemy
combatant, the CSRTs should have relatively little trouble also determining
the lawfulness of his combatant status.
Adding responsibilities to the CSRTs, moreover, should not
substantially hamper their adjudicatory efficiency. The new question that the
CSRTs would be required to answer follows logically from the original one
and pertains to the same set of underlying facts. The CSRTs would also only
need to consider the issue of eligibility for trial by military commission in
the small subset of cases where (1) the detainee has been determined to be
an enemy combatant and (2) the government has indicated that it wishes to
try the detainee in front of a military commission. In all other cases, the
CSRTs' inquiry would be identical to the status quo, ceasing once the binary
determination of enemy combatant status was made.
Not only should the CSRTs prove adept at adjudicating eligibility for
trial by commission, but there are good reasons to prefer that they do so

26. An adverse decision regarding combatant status empowers the government to confine an
individual until the end of hostilities-which, in the ongoing War on Terror, could be decades
away. An adverse decision regarding eligibility for trial by military commission allows the
government to try an individual for offenses against the laws of war (but of course does not
guarantee his conviction). These consequences are similar in their severity.
27. This, of course, is a contestable proposition. No court has yet ruled on the
constitutionality of the CSRTs, though their validity has been challenged on due process grounds
by Guantdnamo detainees. See, e.g., Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and
Complaint for Injunctive, Declaratory, and Other Relief at 13, 25-26, Hicks v. Bush (D.C. Cir.
filed Aug. 31, 2004) (No. 1:02-cv-00299-CKK), available at http://www.jenner.com/files/
tbls69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/393/Hicks-amendedpetition-complaint.pdf.
My
view is that the CSRTs are probably constitutional under Hamdi but that further procedural
protections for detainees should be implemented even if they are not constitutionally mandated.
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rather than Article III courts or military commissions. First, conventional
courts are currently only able to address the personal jurisdiction issue if it
is raised before them in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. It is
obviously preferable for the detainee to have an automatically available
forum for contesting his eligibility for trial by commission than to need to
file a habeas petition in order to challenge his commission's personal
jurisdiction over him.2 8 Courts considering habeas petitions would also be
one-time (or, at best, infrequent) players at distinguishing between types of
enemy combatants, lacking both the expertise that the CSRTs will develop
through practice and the CSRT military officers' understanding of the
battlefield and the status of persons on it. Second, military commissions
would waste limited resources by conducting their own duplicative inquiry
into the factual circumstances of the detainee's apprehension. Once a CSRT
has already investigated the detainee's status, there is no reason for a
commission to reinvent the wheel. Requiring commissions to assess
eligibility would also increase the likelihood that extensive government
preparations for a prosecution would come to naught if it was found that
personal jurisdiction is absent. The CSRTs are therefore well suited to
classifying enemy combatants and are a better institutional choice for this
task than either conventional courts or military commissions.
III
This Comment has sought to explore the interplay between the two
types of adjudicatory bodies created within the Department of Defense
since September 11, 2001-in particular, the ways in which one, the
CSRTs, could be modified so as to avert a constitutional due process
problem with the other, the military commissions. This Comment in no way
addresses the many other legal questions that currently surround the
military commissions. 29 But its proposal to broaden the scope of the
CSRTs' fact-finding powers does offer a pragmatic solution to one
conspicuous flaw with the commissions. If adopted, trials by military
commissions would be more likely to survive legal challenge-and more
likely to be fair when they do take place.
-Nicholas Stephanopoulos

28. One could imagine a requirement that an Article III court resolve the question of personal
jurisdiction before the detainee could appear before a military commission. Such a requirement,
however, would needlessly divide proceedings over a detainee among three separate institutions:
CSRTs, Article III courts, and military commissions. It would also erode the principal appeal of
military commissions: namely, that they are flexible adjudicatory bodies tailored to the unique
needs of the military.
29. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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